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A Corpo-Civic Space: A Notion To Address Social Media’s Corporate/Civic Hybridity 
by Carolina Are 
 
Abstract 
This article proposes a solution to understand the spatial hybridity of social media spaces 
such as Facebook and Instagram, constructed between a corporate entity and a civic space. 
Switching the main poles of third space theory to represent ‘corporate’ and ‘civic’ spaces, 
this essay compares Facebook/Instagram to similar offline spaces in order to propose they are 
a ‘corpo-civic’ space. In doing so, it provides recommendations for fairer moderation of user 
content posted on these platforms based on international human rights standards and ethics 
that already exist offline.  
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I. Introduction 
This essay compares and contrasts social networking platforms such as 
Facebook/Instagram to offline spaces in order to provide a possible solution towards 
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understanding their spatial hybridity, constructed between a corporate entity and a civic 
space. It does so by applying third space theory1 to social media2, switching the main poles of 
third space theory to represent ‘corporate’ and ‘civic’ spaces, (Humphreys, 2007; Oldenburg, 
1999; Svensson, 2018). While social networks describe themselves as ‘platforms’ (Ball, 
2018; Gillespie, 2010; Zuckerberg, 2018), they have been widely conceptualised as virtual or 
a new set of ‘spaces,’ where people meet and interact (Burkell et al., 2014; Svensson, 2018; 
White and Le Cornu, 2011). In comparing offline spaces presenting similar spatial hybridity 
to social media, this essay advances the idea of ‘corpo-civic’ social networking spaces in 
order to provide a framework for their governance not unlike that of similar offline areas.  
Other articles before this pointed out social networking platforms’ role as civic 
engagement tools (Sloan and Quan-Haase, 2017; Smith et al., 2014), while also noting their 
hybridity and the interests at stake in moderating what is posted on them (Baym and boyd, 
2012; Bartlett, 2018; Gillespie, 2010; Kaye, 2019; Paasonen et al., 2019; etc). Yet, no clear 
attempt has been made so far from mere description of that hybridity, and defining it in order 
to provide possible solutions to these spaces’ future governance. As will become apparent in 
this essay, social media would benefit from better relationships between the governed and the 
governing, abandoning a top-down approach in favour of more involvement with citizens’ 
activities (Foucault, 1980) and introducing more government regulation to ensure social 
networks embody much needed public values. This essay explores the idea that online and 
social media spaces like Facebook/Instagram are neither a civic or a corporate space, but a 
‘corpo-civic’ space instead.  
At the time of writing - Spring 2020 - nation-states worldwide have implemented 
shutdown measures to protect their citizens from the Coronavirus, with a subset of white-
collar workers compelled by the global and public emergency to work remotely and social 
interactions taking place online (Paul, 2020). As a consequence, the entire social space is 
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rendered digital by lockdowns. This has intensified a variety of censorship, privacy and 
harassment concerns. 
Already before the pandemic, social networking platforms were accused of wrongly 
censoring content that they considered dangerous for their community and their business. 
Since 2019, Instagram’s murky account deletion and censorship processes such as the 
‘vaguely inappropriate content policy’3, known amongst users as the ‘shadowban’, have 
affected athletes, educators, artists, sex workers, the LGBTQIA+ community and people of 
colour (Cook, 2020). Through this policy, Instagram has been hiding posts it deems as 
sexually suggestive from its Explore page and, in August 2019, it had to apologise to pole 
dancers4, Carnival Dancers5 and other communities for wrongly censoring their posts (Are, 
2019b; Taylor, 2019). Instagram denied intentional targeting of specific communities6, 
arguing content and hashtags were moderated “in error” (Are, 2019b). At the time of writing, 
the platform has either denied that certain censorship techniques exist7 (Cook, 2020) or 
refused to provide any further clarity about the reasoning behind them (Are, 2019a,b; Cook, 
2019; Kaye, 2019; Paasonen et al., 2019). The ‘shadowban’ may take new shapes and forms 
now, at a time when online visibility is the only means of expression and communications 
allowed to most users (Are, 2019a;b; Constine, 2019; Paasonen et al., 2019: 62).  
With regards to privacy, video conferencing app Zoom8 - currently one of the most 
used services for remote working during the pandemic - has been raising a variety of 
concerns about its handling of user data and chat infiltrations known as “Zoombombing” 9 
(Lorenz and Alba, 2020; Paul, 2020). Additionally, news that the United States’ Center for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is looking at mobile advertising industry data to 
analyse people’s movements in the midst of the pandemic10 worried users about companies 
weaponising their data against them for prediction and control purposes (Hern, 2020b). 
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Meanwhile, social media users continue to be trolled online, even when they are sharing their 
journey of surviving the virus11 (Mohdin, 2020). 
Precisely because the entire social, cultural and political space has now been rendered 
digital by COVID-19 lockdowns, it is necessary to address how social networking platforms’ 
spatial hybridity - in between a civic and a corporate space - can be used in a way that does 
not harm public spaces and their users’ rights.  This article proposes a new definition for 
social media spaces such as Facebook and Instagram. To do so, section II describes offline 
spaces presenting a similar spatial hybridity; in section III, social media’s own spatial 
hybridity is compared to that of offline spaces; and finally, in section IV, third space theory 
frames social media spaces as ‘corpo-civic’ spaces, providing recommendations for fairer 
moderation of user content posted on these platforms, based on international human rights 
standards. 
 
II. Offline Spatial Hybridity: Late Twentieth Century Forms of Spatial Hybridity 
 
This essay applies different notions and instances of offline spatial hybridity to social 
networks, and to Facebook/Instagram in particular. These spaces present a spatial 
conundrum, as they are destined for public use but are owned by private corporations and/or 
their stockholders. However, before discussing the nature of this spatial hybridity, it is 
necessary to briefly outline what civic spaces look like offline, stating what the public can 
expect from a civic space outside of social media, and to show what spatial hybridity looks 
like offline.  
Offline, civic spaces are areas that are intended to be accessible to the public and to 
bring people together.  Moeckli states that a place is public if it is accessible to everyone, 
5 
meaning that equality - the rule that “everyone has the same rights to access and use public 
space” - is an inseparable element of the notion of public space (Moeckli, 2016: 320).  For 
Humphreys, public or civic spaces are “non‐domestic physical sites that are distinguished by 
their relative accessibility, such as dance clubs, parks, restaurants, bars, cafes, laundromats, 
and the street,” (Humphreys, 2007: 344). Charity Privacy International12 (2019), too, views 
civic spaces as “settings where people formulate ideas, discuss them with like-minded people 
and groups, raise dissenting views, consider possible reforms, expose bias and corruption, 
and organise to advocate for political, economic, social, environmental, and cultural change.” 
For these spaces to be public and shared, their inhabitants need to follow rules and laws 
established and enforced by institutions (Firmino and Duarte, 2016). However, a variety of 
authors have argued that, increasingly, traditional, offline civic spaces have become privately 
owned, presenting an ownership conundrum. As a prologue to the discussion of ‘corpo-civic’ 
hybrid social media spaces,  the following section focuses on the mid-and-late 20th Century 
emergence of shopping malls, gated communities and public areas governed through private 
security, in order to showcase different instances of spatial hybridity not unlike the one 
presented by social media platforms.  
Both Sorkin (1992) and Crawford (1992) talk about the increasing ‘mallisation’ of the 
United States in the 1990s, with cities becoming a succession of malls, department stores, 
chains. Crawford, in particular, argues that changes in American city planning focusing 
heavily on spaces encouraging consumption have meant that public areas have become a 
commodity. She argues that shopping malls repackaged the city into a safer and cleaner 
suburban hub, turning these privately owned spaces into “a community and social center” 
(Crawford, 1992: 23). Because of their corporate ownership and this focus on consumption, 
shopping malls present a spatial hybridity: they can be seen as a semi-public space, as they 
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are an accessible area for public gathering, but owned by a private entity with an aim to sell 
goods and experiences. 
Another example of offline spaces presenting a spatial hybridity can be found in gated 
communities. Gated communities are housing developments or residential areas “with 
restricted access that makes normally public spaces private,” and feature walls, fences, 
guarded entrances and physical barriers (Blakely and Snyder, 1998: 53). For Ergun and 
Kulkul, “gated communities” exemplify the conflict between public and private zones in 
civic spaces, with the term signifying “a semi-public space which lies within the dichotomy 
of public and private space and is accepted as a buffer zone in which the attributes and uses 
of all types of spaces are interwoven,” (Ergun and Kulkul, 2019: 777).  For them, the gated 
community is pseudo-public for its residents to the exclusion of non-residents, reproducing a 
common conflict in urban space “that incorporates the concepts of both public and private 
areas” (ibid).  
A further example of a spatial hybrid is presented by civic or public spaces governed 
and surveilled through private security - be that through private security firms, or surveillance 
cameras - in what Firmino and Duarte call a “third territorial layer” (2016: 747).  The authors 
draw attention to the “unnegotiated” gaze of cameras, which are owned by unknown private 
actors and look over spaces that society expects to be under State control, with the tacit 
acceptance and support of the State (ibid: 745). Sorkin, too, mentions an “obsession with 
‘security’” in spaces such as malls, resulting in increasing “manipulation and surveillance” of 
citizens, changing the role of city planning from integrator to segregator that excludes and/or 
herds undesirables (Sorkin, 1992: XIII)13.   
The spatial hybridities presented by the above spaces raise questions about 
corporations’ and private entities’ interests in public life and in citizens’ everyday life, 
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creating spaces in between a civic and a corporate entity. Indeed, these spaces are often 
accessible to everyone with Internet access, but imply both interaction with peers and 
consumption or use of corporate services and goods, or at the very least interaction with a 
private actor. This brings Rose to argue that citizenship no longer means mere interaction 
with the State, but that it entails “active engagement in a diversified and disperse variety of 
private, corporate and quasi-corporate practices, of which working and shopping are 
paradigmatic,” (Rose, 2000:  327).  
The securitisation of offline public spaces - be they privately owned, or privately 
surveilled – and its resulting exclusion of ‘undesirables’ are, for Moeckli (2016), preventive 
rather than punitive measures. While he argues that the State and private entities are and 
should be allowed to exclude people from spaces on a legal basis - e.g. when a crime is 
committed, or when a rule is broken -  measures that exclude people from public space on a 
preventive basis without legal justification “interfere with (a range of) fundamental rights” 
(Moeckli, 2016: 139). These preventive measures are often directed against people who are 
perceived to be a risk, such as youths, foreigners and the like, in a clear violation of human 
rights that can make public spaces increasingly exclusionary (ibid; Brown, 2013).  
Despite the privatisation and securitisation of offline public spaces however, the private 
businesses governing them still have a responsibility towards society, are expected to follow 
rules set out by governments and to respect people’s rights.  
Human rights are protected by the rule of law at an international level, as stated by the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). Laws are a prerequisite for upholding liberty 
and equality: “By requiring authorities to act in accordance with laws declared publicly in 
clear terms in advance, the rule of law enables people to plan and act as autonomous rational 
beings and thus to exercise their liberties,” (Moeckli, 2016: 131). Therefore, public spaces - 
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whether they are privately owned or not - are expected to be governed by a clear set of rules 
equally applied to everyone, excluding people only once those rules are violated (ibid).  
Aside from being subject to national and international law, private enterprises can be 
expected to have responsibilities and obligations towards society (Wulfson, 2001). For 
Griffin and Prakash (2014), this corporate responsibility manifests itself in a variety of ways: 
not only through philanthropy, but also through paying more than minimum wage, providing 
health care benefits, creating retirement funds or educational opportunities for employees, 
pollution abatement and the like. Brunk (2012), too, talks of “consumer perceived ethicality” 
in relation to a brand’s image, stating that consumer perceptions of brands and corporate 
entities being ethical is associated with them abiding by the law, avoiding doing any harm 
and having a positive impact on the community.  
Offline hybrid spaces are therefore still expected to follow a set of rules and behave 
ethically.  However, as will become apparent in the following section, similar expectations, 
responsibilities and duties are not always expected of social media - and therefore online - 
spaces presenting these spatial hybridities.  
 
III. Social Media Spatial Hybridity 
 
Social networking companies seem to prefer to define themselves as communications 
utilities or technology companies (Ball, 2018; Zuckerberg, 2018). They have been viewed as 
broadcast tools to voice one’s freedom of expression, a space for political discussion, 
connected with elections and political campaigns and movements such as the Arab Spring, 
the #MeToo movement, #BlackLivesMatter, #OccupyWallStreet (Sloan and Quan-Haase, 
2017; Smith et al., 2014), offering “an opportunity for marginalised people to represent 
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themselves” (Vivienne, 2016: 10). The founder of Facebook Mark Zuckerberg (2018) himself 
said he started working in the technology sector as “it can be a democratizing force for 
putting power in people's hands.”  
Yet, a variety of authors disagree with the notion of social networks as a mere platform 
or utility. Social media’s hybridity became quickly apparent, initially with regards to the 
viewership and accessibility of the content posted on them, in what Baym and boyd defined a 
“conundrum of visibility” (Baym and boyd, 2012: 322). They argued that these platforms 
“complicate the very nature of public life” as they “blur boundaries between presence and 
absence, time and space, control and freedom, personal and mass communication, private and 
public, and virtual and real” (ibid: 320).  
The hybridity of social networking platforms is exemplified by Gillespie’s (2010) 
argument that the word ‘platform’ is nothing other than a smart business strategy by social 
media companies, allowing them to become appealing to users, creators, advertisers while 
also maintaining enough freedom from policy-makers and evading responsibilities to over-
regulate content. The idea of the ‘platform’ has a quadruple duty for Gillespie, fitting with the 
egalitarian idea of giving everyone a voice, placing platforms as facilitators with no motive 
other than making content available, but also making them appealing to advertisers to show 
how they can be used to host their content, too. Finally, the term is also valuable in legal 
environments, placing platforms as neutral with regards to the content posted on them, “a 
vehicle for art rather than its producer or patron, where liability should fall to the users 
themselves,” (Gillespie, 2010: 358). Platforms also allow for the sale and trading of goods 
(Busch et al., 2018), and can be viewed as an online marketplace, similarly to a mall or a 
department store.  
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For the purpose of this essay, social networking platforms will be understood as virtual 
spaces. For Burkell et al., publicness is about space: something is public “if it occurs in a 
space (real or virtual), where there can be no expectation of freedom from observation by 
others,” because by existing in that space citizens surrender any claim to privacy (Burkell et 
al., 2014: 977). White and Le Cornu14 (2011), too, write that people ‘meet’ on social media, 
creating “an impression of location and of social space”.  
However, social media present a spatial hybridity similar to the aforementioned offline 
spaces, where different actors come into play. Authors such as Burkell et al. (2014) Svensson 
(2018) already pointed out their spatial hybridities, referring to social networks and to their 
connected subcultures as a ‘liminal civic space’. For Svensson, the liminality is somewhere 
in-between acceptability and unacceptability of content posted (Svensson, 2018); for Burkell 
et al., social media spaces “occupy a liminal territory between ‘open’ and ‘closed’” to users 
from different groups (Burkell et al., 2014:  975).  
This essay wishes to shift the conversation about social media’s hybridity away from 
visibility and towards the expressive and ownership tensions within their spaces. In 2012, 
Baym and boyd predicted that social media were going to “redefine publicness” as we know 
it (Baym and boyd, 2012: 328). While the authors were referring to posts’ visibility, this 
essay argues that social media’s redefinition of publicness has materialised through the 
tension arising from their function in public life paired with their corporate ownership. 
Indeed, audiences are no longer doubting the ‘publicness’ of posting content on social media: 
they assume that the information posted on social networking platforms can travel with no 
boundaries, resulting in users losing control of their content whether they are posting from a 
space they consider private or from a public one - unless they deliberately decide to set their 
accounts to ‘private’, only for their contacts to see (Burkell et al., 2014; Instagram, ND).  
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Despite the similarities that social networking platforms present with offline spatially 
hybrid spaces, they are not governed in the same way, with their rules and safeguards, partly 
because of the fast, exponential growth they experienced and partly due to issues, breaches 
and abuse happening in different jurisdictions (Hardaker and McGlashan, 2017).  This has 
produced a variety of crucial governance issues, three of which this essay will address: 
monopolies, human rights issues and lack of clarity towards users, both in terms of clarity of 
how data is collected and used, and in terms of how content is censored.  
A variety of authors have been voicing concerns about concentration of social media 
ownership into few hands. For van Dijck, Nieborg and Poell15 (2019), the companies 
attracting the main worries about concentration are Alphabet-Google, Amazon, Facebook, 
Apple, and Microsoft (GAFAM), which they call ‘The Big Five’, an elite of gate-keepers into 
digital markets. Bartlett warns about private companies making decisions based on 
“shareholder interest, or the political views of the founders” (Bartlett, 2018: 147), while 
Kaye, too, writes that: 
  
Today, a few private companies, driven to expand shareholder value, control 
social media. And yet the rules of speech for public space, in theory, should be 
made by relevant political communities, not private companies that lack 
democratic accountability and oversight. If left alone, the companies will gain 
ever greater power over expression in the public sphere, (Kaye, 2019: 112). 
 
Concerns over monopolies become even greater when social media algorithms 
governing what audiences see came into the picture. Greenfield (2013)16 cautioned against 
one-size-fits-all autonomous systems such as algorithms set by private businesses regulating 
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wider civic spaces and resources: indeed, if a handful of private, corporate companies run 
social networks, the same algorithms may be applied to the bulk of content automatically, 
without the use of human judgement for determining context or nuance, in order to preserve 
corporate interests. Similarly to offline preventive exclusion measures, algorithms are 
targeted to help companies limit financial damage or improve returns, and they can work on a 
pre-emptive basis, without using active, real-time human judgement, “applying machine-
learning algorithms to historic data to infer and thereby predict future behavior,” (Yeung, 
2018: 508).  
Social networking platforms have also been accused of restricting user rights such as 
freedom of expression. In order to limit the damages from problematic content being posted 
on them, they have introduced community guidelines, enforced through algorithmic 
moderation which, as already mentioned above, has meant that a handful of platforms apply 
the same moderation techniques to the majority of online content (Kaye, 2019; Paasonen et 
al., 2019; van Dijck and Nieborg, 2019; Gillespie, 2010). At times, this has resulted in 
algorithms replicating or even amplifying offline inequality and enforcing unfair censorship 
(Kaye, 2019; Kumar, 2019; Paasonen et al., 2019).  
Social media infrastructure is replicating offline privilege and discrimination, 
particularly of the gendered and racial kind, almost mirroring early social critiques of the 
Internet (Harvey, 2019; Lawson, 2018; Iandoli and Norris, 1997). Even before Facebook 
became a permanent fixture in our lives, Iandoli and Norris (1997), for instance, warned 
about information overloads and the possibility that the Internet and its byproducts would 
replicate offline inequalities. Paasonen et al., too, write that women’s strategies to minimise 
risks offline (e.g. policing how and how often they communicate) are being re-adopted 
online, and that “the Web rapidly reproduced and retrenched gender, sexed, and raced power 
relations,” (Paasonen et al., 2019: 144). 
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A further issue arising from social networking platforms’ spatial hybridity is the lack of 
clarity in social media moderation.  Corporate companies owning social media have so far 
not shone any particular light on their judgement to allow or remove content: no platform 
guidelines case law, or reasoning behind decisions (Kaye, 2019).  Kumar17 (2019), too, writes 
that while platforms like YouTube do tweak their rules each time a crisis emerges, they miss 
“any formalised process of stakeholder participation” in deciding what content stays or goes 
offline. This raises “critical questions about precarity of creator labour and the exploitative 
nature of the relationship between platforms and ‘produsers’”18 and increases doubts over the 
idea that social media platforms’ main aim was to give users a voice (ibid). 
The algorithms that run social media have been routinely deemed as opaque, with a 
variety of authors drawing attention to the lack of clarity and consistency in moderation 
(Bartlett, 2018; Kaye, 2019; Paasonen et al., 2019; Kumar, 2019). For instance, Paasonen et 
al. write that there is an “instability in how, and with what kinds of motives, things get tagged 
and flagged, and how ensuing boundaries of acceptability are being drawn.”19 
While in the 1970s and 1980s so-called ‘techno-utopians’ were sceptical towards any 
form of state regulation of the Internet, the medium and its intended and unintended 
byproducts’ economic, political and social relevance created a tension between the need for 
regulation and the idea of the Net as a decentralised structure (Busch et al., 2018). Although 
the space is now regulated nationally and internationally (ibid), social media regulation still 
has to catch up with the medium’s exponential growth.  
Similarly to how offline spaces saw private corporations enter public areas through 
malls and/or private security and insurance, corporate entities are in charge of our data, our 
speech, our content (Bartlett, 2018; Kaye, 2019). However, offline spaces are governed 
through a set of laws and subject to public expectations of ethics and responsibility, and 
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exclusion from them needs to be consistent with law and with respecting people’s human 
rights. Instead, social networking sites are currently governed by a set of in-platform laws 
made by private businesses that exclude ‘undesirable’ users and leave single individuals in 
precarious charge of their safety (Kaye, 2019; Kumar, 2019; Paasonen et al., 2019 etc), in an 
exclusion from public space that can be compared to medieval ‘banishment’, or sending 
people away from a specified area (Moeckli, 2016: 68). 
 Due to the above issues therefore, this essay argues that there is a discrepancy between 
the regulation of offline hybrid spaces and the regulation of similar social media spaces, to 
the detriment of users’ rights and of fair and consistent social media governance.  
 
IV. A Corpo-Civic Space 
 
This essay advances a possible solution towards fairer governance of hybrid spaces 
such as social media by adapting third space theory to the Facebook/Instagram space, 
providing recommendations based on ethics and on international human rights standards to 
govern said spaces. 
Spatially ambiguous spaces have been described by previous authors as ‘third’ spaces 
or places in a variety of contexts, mainly in relation to a buffer zone between what is 
understood as a space for work and as citizens’ homes. For instance, third places are for 
Oldenburg public spaces beyond work or home where individuals can interact and meet 
informally:  “The third place is a generic designation for a great variety of public spaces that 
host the regular, voluntary, informal, and happily anticipated gatherings of individuals,” 
(Oldenburg, 1999: 16). These spaces are, for the author, crucial towards the development of 
communities and the strengthening of society. If we consider these third places or spaces as 
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still public and civic areas - and therefore as areas that are still under government control - 
then the entrance of these private, corporate actors in our civic life adds a new problematic 
layer to spatial governance.  
Both Humphreys (2007) and Svensson (2018) apply third space theory to explain the 
spatial characteristics of social media platforms, stating third spaces are public spaces that 
host gatherings beyond home and work, where people are on a level playing field and discuss 
topics informally without branding the spaces as political settings. They argue that third 
spaces - both online and offline - are an essential part of sociality. While this essay accepts 
some elements of third space theory for social media - their ‘otherness’ compared to work or 
home and their essential nature towards social interactions - it also updates this theory for the 
post-pandemic social media giants age.  
‘Digital’ third space theory can be understood differently during the Coronavirus 
pandemic. Indeed, while social media platforms do provide a ‘buffer space’ between different 
modes, these modes are no longer ‘work’ and ‘home’, precisely because, as Baym and boyd 
(2012) argue, social media blur the boundaries between public and private and the entire 
working day has to be carried out from home, which becomes a work space and which is no 
longer fully private. Therefore, the discussion should no longer be focused on whether these 
platforms are public or private in terms of visibility of what is posted on them, or about the 
dynamics of a third space in between ‘home’ and ‘work’: it should instead shift to reconciling 
the platforms’ public function with the private nature of their ownership, and to the rules and 
expectations these companies should follow in the space they have created.  
This essay therefore wishes to adapt third space theory to our current context, switching 
the poles of ‘work’ and ‘home’ with ‘corporate’ and ‘civic’ spaces20. In doing so, it wishes to 
advance a view of social media platforms as ‘corpo-civic’ spaces, to create a balance between 
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platform duties and user expectations at a time where social networks are both a social and a 
work space, owned and administered by private corporations (Fig.1).  
 
Figure 1 – Corpo-Civic Spaces, 2020. 
If a civic space is like a “public square” accessible to everyone (Moeckli, 2016; Smith 
et. al, 2014), a space for people to express their own freedom of speech (Kaye, 2019), and a 
setting where users formulate ideas, discussing them with both like-minded people and those 
who disagree (Privacy International, 2019), social networks definitely present elements of the 
description of civic spaces. 
Yet, these platforms are also corporate entities, owned by corporations profiting from 
users’ data, looking to appeal to advertisers and limit the damage of bad publicity (Kaye, 
2019; Paasonen et al., 2019; Bartlett, 2018; Gillespie, 2010). Therefore, this piece argues that 
as private companies, they have to follow a set of norms, rules and laws which are applicable 
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to offline businesses presenting similar spatial hybridity.  Considering that offline public 
spaces used by citizens for civic purposes are supposed to be governed in a way that respects 
citizens’ human rights, then social media spaces should behave ethically, agree to be 
regulated through national and/or transnational agreements and use international human 
rights standards for content moderation instead of preventively banishing undesirable users.  
Similarly to actors ruling offline hybrid spaces, social networking companies should be 
expected to behave ethically. Iandoli and Norris (1997) already predicted the current 
situation, providing guidelines to prevent social networking and Internet companies from 
behaving unethically. These guidelines include building accessible infrastructure to prevent 
the creation of further social divides and creating easy-to-use technology (ibid). Greenfield 
(2008), too, devised ethical guidelines for computing and related systems, stating that these 
systems should be harmless to users, that they should be transparent with regards to their 
ownership and clear with customers about when these systems are operating on them or their 
content; he also added that users should be able to opt out of these systems although this 
particular principle is now unlikely in the age of social media, especially during the 
Coronavirus pandemic. Therefore, if offline businesses are expected to behave ethically, and 
to be transparent and clear when making decisions about their customers, it would be fair to 
say that similar expectations should be required of social networking platforms.  
What is more, similarly to offline businesses, social media should be respecting 
international human rights law and the rights of their customers as quasi-citizens (Binns, 
2019; Greenfield, 2008,2013; Kaye; 2019; Yeung, 2018).  Kaye (2019), in particular, states 
that human rights standards should be part of social media content moderation norms. He 
argues that social networks should promote user agency and diversity, and that they should be 
transparent, decentralising their decision-making to promote freedom of expression (ibid). He 
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adds that social media companies should be subject to industry-wide oversight, and to 
government control.  
The importance of human rights guidelines is recognised beyond nation-state 
jurisdictions. Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, for instance, states 
that everyone has the right to freedom of expression and information subject to restrictions 
that are “in accordance with law” and “necessary in a democratic society” (European Court of 
Human Rights, 1950). Following on from Article 10 and from previous case law, publishing 
content that is shocking or offensive (within reason) is still within the European Convention 
of Human Rights’ scope (ibid; Case of Oberschlick [no. 2] v. Austria. 1997). 
Considering that in offline corpo-civic spaces the exclusion or punishment of citizens 
without legal reasons is considered a human rights violation, this essay takes ethics and 
human rights law into consideration to define users’ rights and companies’ responsibilities 
within a corpo-civic space on social media.  Therefore, this piece argues that in the corpo-
civic spaces social media users currently find themselves in, they should be able to: 
  
1. Post different, challenging, shocking opinions without being censored if they do not 
infringe or limit other people’s rights; 
2. Share content that is within community guidelines even if it is ‘borderline’;  
3. Not be discriminated against according to gender, race, sexual orientation, religion 
and the like, according to Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(European Court of Human Rights, 1950); 
4. Receive accurate, thorough and fair explanations on why and how their content is 
being used or moderated; 
5. Appeal or opt out of decisions made about them if they think they are unfair. 
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The above points would be more consistent with international human rights standards 
governing other types of speech and forms of expression, and would more successfully 
deliver social media founders’ promise to give users a platform that empowers them (Bartlett, 
2018; Zuckerberg, 2018). In order to deliver this promise while maintaining their role as 
private companies, social media giants operating in a corpo-civic space should: 
  
1. Avoid harming and discriminating against their users; 
2. Be transparent about their decisions, moderation teams and bias; 
3. Provide as much clarity as possible to both singular users and to the wider world 
about the ins and outs of its moderation and data usage, allowing for repeated appeals 
if necessary; 
4. Work with user communities to introduce moderation that is fair and diverse and 
represents as many perspectives as possible; 
5. Promote accountability about their actions and decisions with users, the industry and 
governments. 
 
V. Discussion 
  
This article has applied ‘third space theory’ to social media platforms with a focus on 
ownership, comparing offline businesses with social networking giants with the aim to 
provide a framework to reconcile platforms’ spatial hybridity between a public space and a 
corporate entity. The notion of social media platforms as a corpo-civic space has considered 
20 
the fact that, although social networking platforms are currently owned by a handful of 
private corporations, said corporations are finding themselves operating certain civic space 
functions, such as having created a space for people to discuss and debate ideas, and to 
organise to create movements (Kaye, 2019; Privacy International, 2019; Sloan and Quan-
Haase, 2017 etc). 
However, in proposing the notion of social media as a corpo-civic space, this article 
does not propose turning social networking platforms into not-for-profit organisations. It only 
states that, at present, the concentration of ownership of the main social networking platforms 
in too few hands is raising the above stated concerns about social media moderation (Kaye, 
2019; Paasonen et al., 2019; Van Dijck, Nieborg and Poell, 2019 etc), and that such concerns 
need to be addressed from the position society currently finds itself in - namely, using a space 
with civic characteristics largely run by private companies at a time where the entire social 
space has moved online. 
Towards this purpose, and following concerns about social media governance and 
moderation, this article argues it is not sustainable for social networking platforms to 
maintain their power and legitimacy in democracies without admitting to their civic role. 
While recently Facebook announced the creation of an independent oversight board, made of 
journalists, judges and politicians and aimed at promoting freedom of expression on the 
platform21, the issue of social media governance goes beyond one social network and needs 
tighter – although transparent, clear and fair - government regulation to ensure 
recommendations are implemented22 (Hern, 2020a). As both Kaye (2019) and Paasonen et al. 
(2019) state, this is a democracy problem: it is necessary therefore for governments to break 
monopolies to prevent similar, ineffective and discriminatory styles of moderation to be the 
only way in which social media companies govern their spaces.  
21 
Of course, the idea of corpo-civic spaces assumes that users would have access to said 
spaces, and is limited to areas where citizens can benefit from the civic nature of social 
media. Furthermore, it is necessary to note that different countries, with different human 
rights standards and political systems, understand social spaces and their relationship with 
citizens’ freedoms differently. However, precisely because of this, a shared international 
understanding of social networking spaces and of the rules and regulations they should follow 
is needed. This article argues that the definition it proposes would be a fair compromise 
between the status quo and fairer moderation conditions, striking a balance between social 
media corporations’ business interests and user rights. 
Finally, the idea of social networks as a corpo-civic space presents an obvious temporal 
limitation: both community guidelines governing social networking platforms and 
government legislation related to them are in constant, international flux.  Therefore, the 
notion of a corpo-civic space only works until governments or international law decide to 
define social networking platforms as a different type of space.  
  
V. Conclusion 
  
To conclude, in the words of David Kaye, social media giants now: 
  
influence public space, public conversation, democratic choice, access to 
information, and perception of the freedom of expression. They can no longer 
hide behind the curtain of corporate competitiveness. They have to acknowledge 
22 
their unusual, perhaps unprecedented, roles as stewards of public space (Kaye, 
2019: 52). 
  
This article hopes that referring to social networking companies as a corpo-civic space -  
owned and administered largely by private corporations also performing a civic function, 
such as ensuring healthy public debate and to organise to create movements - will provide a 
contribution towards new, possible ways of understanding the ever-evolving space of social 
media moderation. 
Defining social networks as a corpo-civic space takes note of the status quo and of 
current controversies in moderation, while proposing a state-regulated moderation to uphold 
users’ human rights and social networks’ initial and self-stated mission to put power in 
people’s hands. 
 
Endnotes 
 
 
1 Third spaces or places are areas between work and home where informal gatherings take 
space. For Oldenburg: “The third place is a generic designation for a great variety of public 
spaces that host the regular, voluntary, informal, and happily anticipated gatherings of 
individuals,” (Oldenburg, 1999: 16). 
 
2 Humphreys, 2007. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1083-
6101.2007.00399.x. 
 
3https://techcrunch.com/2019/04/10/instagram-borderline/. 
 
4 https://bloggeronpole.com/2019/07/instagram-apologises-to-pole-dancers-about-the-
shadowban/. 
5 
 https://www.vice.com/en_in/article/7xg5dd/instagram-apologises-for-blocking-caribbean-
carnival-content. 
 
6 https://bloggeronpole.com/2019/07/instagram-denies-censorship-of-pole-dancers-and-sex-
workers/. 
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7 https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/instagram-shadow-banning-is-
real_n_5e555175c5b63b9c9ce434b0?ri18n=true&guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6
Ly9jb25zZW50LnlhaG9vLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAF8_eRyIGvzto-
AsdVvbBnZvJ78oksVSVJBARCX-
bf_9EqPc5J_cjbR2DDeyTehCG6_de46hQbBFtv7xrXtHEw9yVokQs8iyjE5dw5-
PC8PY4Tx1n7IUSZ9a9ljOIfK05uoHq3YT2-qt2W77YVOn5WQSB0duxtLz45Wtg6IvCIdY. 
 
8 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/apr/02/zoom-technology-security-
coronavirus-video-
conferencing?CMP=fb_gu&utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Facebook&fbclid=IwAR1T0
k4vPKMPi-
cRzAtTDo5PWEzAK2TdFPs2cfHMpCLBUUBsKjSQgrCZkU0#Echobox=1585838474. 
9 
 https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/03/technology/zoom-harassment-abuse-racism-fbi-
warning.html. 
 
10 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/apr/02/experts-warn-of-privacy-risk-as-us-
uses-gps-to-fight-coronavirus-spread. 
 
11 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/20/dont-take-any-chances-warning-of-
woman-with-covid-19-shared-online. 
 
 
12 https://privacyinternational.org/long-read/2852/protecting-civic-spaces. 
 
 
13 Nikolas Rose, too, states how administering the “marginalia” and identifying risky 
individuals to exclude has become a key part of controlling public space (Rose, 200: 333). 
 
14 https://firstmonday.org/article/view/3171/3049. 
15 
 https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/transnational-materialities. 
16 
 https://urbanomnibus.net/2013/10/against-the-smart-city/. 
17 
 https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/algorithmic-dance-youtubes-adpocalypse-and-
gatekeeping-cultural-content-digital. 
 
18 Kumar, 2019. The author uses the term “produsers” to define the tension between social 
media users that produce the content that helps social media platforms to sell and, essentially, 
to exist. 
 
19 Paasonen et al., 2019, p. 6. 
 
20 This essay switches the poles of third space theory from ‘work’ and ‘home’ to ‘corporate’ 
and ‘civic’ because hybrid nature of spaces in between the corporate and the civic, such as 
social media. Indeed, moving on from ‘public’ and ‘private’ debate related to a person’s 
visibility or privacy within a space, this essay applies the ‘thirdness’ element of said liminal 
spaces in between two different settings to tensions arising from these spaces’ ownership, as 
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the governance issues caused by corporate actors overseeing a civic space is now more 
relevant towards governing social media than mere understandings of privacy.   
 
21 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/may/06/facebook-oversight-board-
freedom-expression-helle-thorning-schmidt-alan-rusbridger. 
 
22 Government regulation of speech is of course relative depending on the State in question 
and on political systems, and can be perceived as a form of censorship. However, towards 
this essay and with regards to the ‘corporate’ and ‘civic’ tension pointed out in social media 
settings, it would be fair to say that a form of transparent, clear and fair government control 
would be more appropriate than leaving social media governance to private interests.  
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